Jacek Podsiadło’s poem interests me in this context as a description of a moment of tenderness (a word that Podsiadło would already write with a capital letter as early as twenty years prior to Olga Tokarczuk’s Nobel Prize and guides to positive egoism). It’s the moment between 'I can imagine' and 'I can see clearly' when the action slows down and the princesses walking to a math classroom become submerged in a dreamlike light falling from nowhere in particular. Without such moments of stillness and hallucinogenic intensity, there is no poetry. As Podsiadło explains elsewhere, 'time executes sentence after sentence / on flowers, on resolutions / on opera arias. Suddenly the guillotine’s sharp admonition / descends on us, suddenly. / A gust of reminiscence sweeps us off, or a shock / wave of Tenderness.'
One may, of course, list countless examples of poetic still frames. 'It’s like the table at our student parties when I would suddenly stop being there and would see us all talking, laughing, as if we were changed already into those who had lived long ago' (Czesław Miłosz, trans. Czesław Miłosz and Robert Hass). 'Return in thought to the concert where music flared' (Adam Zagajewski). Viewing the Vistula River valley from a bank side under Annopol, Edward Stachura referred to such experiences as 'all the brightness'. Wisława Szymborska devoted one of her poems to Isadora Duncan’s dance pose and her stillness, as if torn from the stream of time. The beginning of Andrzej Stasiuk’s Dukla, too, constitutes a magnificent poem on the nature of the world emerging from such moments.
What is tenderness? In her Nobel lecture, Tokarczuk dubbed it 'the most modest form of love'. 'Tenderness is deep emotional concern about another being, its fragility, its unique nature, and its lack of immunity to suffering and the effects of time', 'It appears wherever we take a close and careful look at another being, at something that is not our self.' Let’s phrase it like this: tenderness, the key ingredient of poetry – which, I believe, fits here better than the novel, to which Tokarczuk refers – constitutes a form of possession, a possession more intense and real than that which we can come into by purchasing goods or services. There is no contradiction between 'being' and 'having', since love, which constitutes the highest possible intensification of being, is at the same time the highest – and the only satisfactory – form of possession. An original Japanese cast-iron pot for brewing green tea is certainly something, but it’s only thanks to tenderness (Tokarczuk again) that 'the teapot starts to talk', filling up the buzzing silence. Royalty rights to a music piece can help one become an expat and buy them a piece of an artificial island in Dubai, but the real owner of the piece is the one who cries, makes love, or speeds along a country road to the music. In the world of economics and newspapers, Elon Musk already possesses everything with the exception of Twitter. The truth is, however, that he can only really possess that which, at any point of his life, he has come to love.
Put briefly, then, the reason why capital is evil isn’t the fact that it encourages us to possess things. After all, things aren’t harmful by definition. It’s not even due to its secret fantasies of eternity. The desire for everything is an anthropological constant. Most traditional religious and philosophical systems view the human being as a mixture of worldliness and eternity, a mortal body and an immortal soul. The fraud of capital and all the indirectly related forms of degeneration – the pure madness of disparities, the dumps of toxic waste, the wars over resources – result from capitalism’s promise of solving the problem of eternity with a never-ending flow of novelties and amusements. From children’s collectible cards through the recursive loops of electronic games to new, breakthrough seasons of TV series. Let’s finally do justice to Fromm – To Have or to Be? is both a false dichotomy and a very good book. To quote the philosopher, 'ours is the greatest social experiment ever made to solve the question whether pleasure (as a passive affect in contrast to the active affect, well-being and joy) can be a satisfactory answer to the problem of human experience.'